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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3887 
___________ 
 
ROBERT R. VERBANIK, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDANT MICHAEL HARLOW; C/O MICHEL SCHULLER;  
C/O JASON ANDREWS; C/O WALTER YOUREMA; C/O SGT. THOMAS MILLS;  
C/O SGT. ERIC YOHE; C/O CAPTAIN CONRAD DECHANT; C/O A GORDON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00448) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 17, 2013 
Before:  SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Robert Verbanik, proceeding pro se, appeals from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s order granting Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and denying Verbanik’s motion for summary judgment.  For the 
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reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order pursuant to Third 
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Verbanik, previously incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Mercer, 
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Mercer”), filed a complaint in April 2009, alleging numerous claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and in response Verbanik 
filed an amended complaint.  Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint and 
Verbanik filed a second amended complaint.  In his second amended complaint Verbanik 
raised a series of claims against correctional officers and their supervisors employed at 
SCI-Mercer.  The majority of Verbanik’s claims relate to grievances brought against SCI-
Mercer staff pursuant to the Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, Policy 
Statement DC-ADM 804 and to misconduct charges brought against Verbanik  pursuant 
to Inmate Disciplinary and Restricted Housing Procedures, Policy Statement DC-ADM 
801.  Verbanik raised seventeen claims that can generally be categorized as claims of 
retaliation, due process violations, verbal harassment, equal protection violations, 
conspiracy, and supervisory liability.  Verbanik also raised state law claims.   
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Verbanik’s second amended complaint.  The 
District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, determining that Verbanik failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies for many of his claims and failed to state a claim for the 
remainder.  Verbanik appealed and this Court remanded the matter to the District Court 
for further proceedings because it was questionable whether Defendants’ conduct 
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rendered administrative remedies unavailable and because the District Court erred in 
considering matters outside the pleadings without advising the parties and allowing 
Verbanik an opportunity to file an affidavit in response. 
 On remand, Verbanik filed a motion “In Support of Third Circuits 
Remand/Vacation” that the District Court construed as a motion for summary judgment.  
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a response in opposition to 
Verbanik’s motion for summary judgment.  Verbanik also filed a response in opposition 
to Defendants’ motion.  The District Court denied Verbanik’s motion for summary 
judgment and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  The District Court 
declined to grant summary judgment to Defendants based on Verbanik’s alleged failure 
to administratively exhaust his claims and instead granted summary judgment based on 
the claims’ lack of merit.  Verbanik appealed the District Court’s decision and filed a 
motion requesting appointment of counsel.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  McGreevy v. 
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A court reviewing a summary judgment motion 
must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw 
all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 
4 
 
F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, a party opposing summary judgment “must 
present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions’ to show the 
existence of a genuine issue.”  Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv.
III.  
, 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 
2005).   
 A prisoner litigating a retaliation claim must show that the conduct provoking the 
alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some “adverse action” 
at the hands of the prison officials “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and that the constitutionally protected conduct was 
a substantial motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 
333 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If a 
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation the burden shifts to the defendant 
“to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have taken the action 
complained of.”  Hartman v. Moore
Verbanik alleged four specific instances of retaliation: (1) he was housed in A-
block of SCI-Mercer for four months because Defendants believed he was racist, (2) he 
was transferred to a less desirous cell for filing a grievance against a defendant, (3) he 
was locked in a shower for up to two hours for filing a different grievance against a 
defendant, and (4) Defendants fabricated and issued misconduct charges against 
Verbanik in retaliation for his use of the grievance process.   
, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006).   
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The District Court determined, and our review of the record confirms, that as to 
the first two retaliation claims Verbanik failed to state a retaliation claim as a matter of 
law because he did not demonstrate that the living conditions he endured constituted an 
adverse action.  See Allah v. Seiverling
Regarding Verbanik’s third retaliation claim, the District Court concluded that he 
failed to establish the existence of an adverse action because he “has not even alleged that 
he was cold or that the conditions were such that they could be described as unenjoyable 
to an ordinary inmate in a similar situation.”  Verbanik filed a grievance days before the 
shower incident and when he asked two of the defendants if his time in the shower was 
punishment enough, one of them replied “write the warden up again and see what 
happens to you.”  These events may be enough to establish causality between 
Defendants’ conduct and Verbanik’s utilization of his grievance rights, see 
, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Lauren W. ex 
rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007), but being left in the shower 
on one occasion for at most 105 minutes over the required 15 minutes shower-time does 
not, without more,1 constitute an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising their constitutional rights.  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 
(“[W]hether a prisoner-plaintiff has met [the adverse action] prong of his or her 
retaliation claim will depend on the facts of the particular case.”); cf. Gill v. Pidlypchak
                                              
1  Although Verbanik responds to the District Court in his Argument in Support of 
Appeal, noting that he “was left in a closet sized room with only boxer shorts on, so of 
course it was cold,” issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.  See 
Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).    
, 
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389 F.3d 379,  384 (2d Cir. 2004) (sentencing prisoner to three weeks in keeplock 
constituted adverse action).  Consequently, in Verbanik’s third retaliation claim he failed 
to state a prima facie claim because he did not allege an adverse action.  
Finally, regarding the fourth retaliation claim, that Defendants issued false 
misconduct charges against Verbanik, we agree with the District Court that insofar as 
Verbanik stated a prima facie case of retaliation, Defendants have proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct charges would have been filed even if 
Verbanik had not engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that the misconduct 
charges were reasonably related to penological interests.  See Rauser
 Verbanik’s second set of claims alleged due process violations centered on the 
claimed falsified misconduct charges, the misconduct proceedings, and the punishments 
he received as a result of the misconduct charges, 60 and 105 days of disciplinary time 
for separate misconduct charges.  We agree with the District Court that Verbanik has not 
demonstrated that his punishment amounted to an “atypical and significant hardship . . . 
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  
, 241 F.3d at 334.    
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995); see Smith v. Mensinger
   Verbanik’s third set of claims alleged that Defendants verbally harassed him in 
retaliation for his filing of grievances.  We agree with the District Court’s analysis and 
conclusion that Verbanik’s allegations of verbal harassment do no state a cognizable 
, 293 F.3d 641, 652-54 (3d Cir. 2003).  As a result, this 
due process claim fails.   
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claim under § 1983.  See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Dewalt v. Carter
 Verbanik’s fourth set of claims alleged that Defendants violated his equal 
protection rights by selectively punishing him for violation of prison regulations.  In 
order to establish an equal protection claim a prisoner must demonstrate that he was 
purposefully discriminated against and was treated differently than other individuals 
similarly situated.  
, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000). 
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Further, to establish an equal protection claim based on selective enforcement the 
plaintiff must show that the was treated differently based on an “unjustifiable standard, 
such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor, . . . or to prevent the exercise of a 
fundamental right.”  Hill v. City of Scranton
Here, Verbanik claimed that on two occasions he was unfairly targeted for 
violation of prison regulations while other prisoners in violation of the same regulations 
were not disciplined.  Verbanik’s bare allegation of selective enforcement is not enough 
to state a claim; prison officials are accorded deference in their management of prison 
policies and practices in order to maintain prison security.  
, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005) (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
546-47 (1979).  Aside from the fact that other prisoners were not disciplined when 
Verbanik was, he did not indicate that he was purposefully discriminated against.  As the 
District Court noted, Verbanik’s invocation of the concept of equal protection alone fails 
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to show that he was purposefully discriminated against and treated differently based on 
an unjustifiable standard and his claim fails.   
 Verbanik’s fifth set of claims concern allegations that Defendants conspired to 
have a fellow inmate attack Verbanik.  Verbanik acknowledges that he was never 
attacked.  Consequently, we agree with the District Court that even if Defendants had 
conspired to injure Verbanik, absent an overt act that actually did injure him he has failed 
to state a claim.  Nalle v. Oyster
 Verbanik’s sixth set of claims alleged supervisory liability for the previously-
described purported wrongdoing.  However, we agree with the District Court that because 
Verbanik’s claims upon which the supervisory liability was necessarily based were 
inadequate, his claim of supervisory liability fails.  
, 230 U.S. 165, 182 (1913).   
See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement
 Finally, we agree that the District Court appropriately decided not to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Verbanik’s state law claims and dismissed them without 
prejudice because all of the claims over which it had original jurisdiction were dismissed.  
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 
, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster
IV. 
, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 
1995).   
 The District Court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
and denied Verbanik’s motion for summary judgment.  We will summarily affirm the 
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order of the District Court because no substantial question is presented by this appeal.  3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We deny Verbanik’s motion for appointment of counsel.  
